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I. INTRODucarON

N ANY CHILD PLACEMENT DECISION,' the predominant
consideration is the welfare of the child. 2 Accordingly, the most
widely used test in determining child custody is clearly the "best
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond. B.A., University of
Michigan, 1973; J.D., Wayne State University, 1976; LL.M., Temple University,
1980. Member, New Hampshire Bar.
The author would like to thank Kathe Klare for her assistance in the
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1. A state's right to make child custody determinations is recognized under
the theory of parens patriae, which confers upon the state the role of protector
of the children within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brosky & Alford, Sharpening
Solomon's Sword: Current Considerations in Child Custody Cases, 81 DicK. L.
Rav. 683, 684-85 (1977); Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process
Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CALIF. L. REV.
769, 786 (1978); Comment, Child Custody: Best Interests of Children vs. Constitutional Rights of Parents, 81 Dic. L. REV. 733, 734 (1978). One early
Pennsylvania case explained the state's power as follows:
[M]ay not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of education,
or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens patriae, or common
guardian of the community? . . . That parents are ordinarily intrusted with it is because it can seldom be put into better hands;
but where they are incompetent or corrupt, what is there to prevent
the public from withdrawing their faculties, held, as they obviously
are, at its sufferance? The right of parental control is a natural, but
not an unalienable one.
Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839) (emphasis added) (upholding state's
right to place children in house of refuge).
2. See, e.g., Bertin & Klein, Pennsylvania's Developing Child Custody Law,
25 VIL.L. Rav. 752, 760 (1980); Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study of Vague
and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM. L 21, 21 (1965); Sayre, Awarding Custody
of Children, 9 U. CHI. L Rav. 672, 677-78 (1942); Comment, Measuring the
Child's Best Interests - A Study of Incomplete Considerations, 44 DEN. L.J.
132, 132-33 (1967); Comment, supra note 1, at 733.

(955)
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interests of the child" standard.3 Despite its relatively old vintage,
the standard continues to represent a nebulous concept that courts
have rarely been able to define with precision.5 Because of its openended nature, the best interests of the child standard makes relevant
a wide range of evidence pertaining to the fitness of the parents and
the environment in which the child will be raised.6 It is in determining these facts that child placement cases often seek and rely
heavily on the testimony of court-appointed or privately-retained
psychotherapists.7
3. See Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U.
L. REV. 647, 652 (1977); Sayre, supra note 2, at 677-78. The principle
underlying the best interest rule is that neither parent has a presumptive right
to the custody of the child. Comment, supra note 2, at 133.
4. The earliest expression in American case law of a primary concern for
the well-being of the child appears to be the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (Pa. 1813). The first clear
articulation of the best interests of the child standard, however, has been
credited to Judge Cardozo, who stated:
The Chancellor . . . does not proceed upon the theory that the
petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action against the
other or indeed against any one. He acts as parens patriae to do
what is best for the interest of the child. He is to put himself in the
position of a "wise, affectionate, and careful parent," and make
provision for the child accordingly. . . . He is not adjudicating a
controversy between adversary parties, to compose their private differences. He is not determining rights "as between a parent and a
child," or as between one parent and another. .
. Equity does not
concern itself with such disputes in their relation to the disputants.
Its concern is for the child.
Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925), quoting Queen
v. Gyngall, [1898] 2 Q.B. 232, 241 (Esher, M.R.). For other early cases expressing a paramount concern for the well-being of the child, see, e.g., United
States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256); Kelsey v. Green,
69 Conn. 291, 37 A. 679 (1897); Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); Sheers
v. Stein, 75 Wis. 44, 43 N.W. 728 (1889).
5. See, e.g., R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, 362 (1973); Mnookin,
Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminancy,
39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 226, 227 (Summer 1975).
The best interests of the child standard has been codified in many state
statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 722 (Supp. 1980); GA. CODE § 74-107 (1981). Even when statutorily articulated
with specific factors for the court to consider, the standard, while somewhat'
more concrete, nonetheless has been characterized as "sweeping, slippery words
which may say much and at the same time say nothing." R. SLOVENKO, supra,
at 371. See also Comment, supra note 2, at 133-34.
At least one court has held that a standard of "the best interests and
welfare of the child" is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore violates the due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. See Linn v. Linn, - Nev.
-, -, 286 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1980) (termination of parental rights action).
6. See, e.g., R. SLOVENKO, supra note 5, at 371; Comment, supra note 2,
at 134-42.
7. See R. SLOVENKO, supra note 5, at 361. A court's authority to appoint a
psychotherapist is widely recognized. See, e.g., id. at 372; Weihofen, Testi.
monial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 53, 75-76 (1965).
CIN.
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The use of psychotherapist testimony in child placement decisions can arise in at least five situations: 8 1) private custody

actions, generally arising out of the dissolution of marriage; 9 2)
child dependent and neglect or abuse actions, usually combined
with a determination that the present custodian is in some way
unfit; 10 3) termination of parental rights cases, where there is also
the need for finding parental unfitness; 11 4) guardianship cases; 12
and 5) disposition hearings subsequent to a determination of delinquency. 18 The application of the best interests standard is quite
similar in each situation as the court attempts to predict, based on
the judge's best estimate, what will happen to the child. 14 Necessarily, this type of inquiry opens to examination many facets of an
15
individual's life.
8. See generally Mnookin, supra note 5, at 232-46.
9. See, e.g., Barker v. Barker, 92 Idaho 204, 440 P.2d 137 (1968); Usen v.
Usen, 359 Mass. 453, 269 N.E.2d 442 (1971); D. v. D., 108 N.J. Super. 149, 260
A.2d 255 (1969). See generally Mnookin, supra note 5, at 232-37.
10. See, e.g., In re Fred J., 89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 152 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1979);
In re Carthen, 66 Ill. App. 3d 780, 384 N.E.2d 723 (1978); In re Doe Children,
93 Misc. 2d 479, 402 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1978).
11. See, e.g., In re Crooks, 262 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1978); Allen v. Department for Human Resources, 540 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1976); State ex rel. Juvenile
Dep't v. Martin, 19 Or. App. 28, 526 P.2d 647 (1974). See generally Comment,
Parental Incapacity as a Standard for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 814 (1979).
In Pennsylvania, judges are statutorily empowered to terminate parental
rights permanently and free the child for adoption against a parent's wishes
upon the parent's failure or inability to properly care for the child. See 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2511 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82). The best interests of the
child standard is incorporated in the statute's mandate that the court "give
primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child." Id.
12. See Mnookin, supra note 5, at 237-40. Guardianship actions generally
arise when neither of a child's parents is alive or available and a nonparent
seeks custodial rights. Id. at 238.
13. See, e.g., In re B, 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978); Rusecki v. State,
56 Wis. 2d 299, 201 N.W.2d 832 (1972). For discussion of In re B, see notes
170-75 & 229-31 and accompanying text infra.
14. One judge has described the difficult task of child custody adjudications
as follows:
These contested child custody cases are never easy . . . . From
the nature of such disputes, involving as they do one of the basic
instincts and great primal urges of human existence, whichever way
judges rule is bound to leave a trail of heartache and pain. But
decide them we must, for it is our job ...
Bowler v. Bowler, 355 Mich. 686, 694, 96 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1959).
15. One commentary has suggested that "the modern child custody contest
usually entails more complex facets than were mentioned in the oft-quoted Old
Testament account of King Solomon's award of the custody of an infant to its
real mother." Brosky & Alford, supra note 1, at 683, citing 1 Kings 3:23. See
also H. CLAR.K, DOMESTic RELATIONS 572 (1968).
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Under these circumstances, the mental conditions of not only
the proposed custodian but also that of the child becomes material.' 0
In many situations, however, the parties will seek to exclude testimony by asserting a psychotherapist-patient privilege.1 This creates
a fruitful area for conflict over the privilege's applicability.
Most often, the attempted exclusion of psychotherapist testimony has been based on a statutory privilege and has been unsuccessful.18 Increasingly, an alternative assertion has been that the
privilege may be part of the constitutional right of privacy. 9 The
position of this article is that the decision of whether to recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, when based on traditional privilege
analysis, leads to a confusing analytic framework burdened with exceptions.2 0 Furthermore, whether based on a statutory privilege or
a constitutional right of privacy, an analysis premised on logical
relevancy is more helpful. 2' Indeed, such an approach may be required to protect the constitutional right of privacy.
The article focuses first on the statutorily-recognized psychotherapist-patient privilege, including a history of its evolution, a
discussion of its use in child-placement cases, and a proposal for an
appropriate analytical approach to the privilege issue based on
logical relevancy. The latter part of the article examines the constitutional right to privacy as it applies to the privilege, including a
review of pertinent judicial decisions and a discussion of a proposed
analytical approach in the constitutional context.

II. STATUTORY PRIVILEGE
A. History and Scope
At common law, the attorney-client relationship was the only
professional association protected by an evidentiary privilege.2 2 In
16. See, e.g., Barker v. Barker, 92 Idaho 204, 440 P.2d 137 (1968); Moosa
v. Abdalla, 248 La. 344, 178 So. 2d 274 (1965); Usen v. Usen, 359 Mass. 453,
269 N.E.2d 443 (1971); In re B, 482 Pa. 471, 894 A.2d 419 (1978).
17. The privilege is the patient's, not the psychotherapist's. See 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2386 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
18. See section IIB infra.
19. See section IIIA infra.
20. For a discussion of the numerous exceptions recognized under traditional privilege analysis, see notes 47-123 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 124-45 and accompanying text infra.
22. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. 1972); 2 D. LoUISELL
C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§ 215

(1978); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17,

§ 2286. The attorney-client privilege arose out of "a consideration for the oath
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1828, the New York legislature enacted the first statutory recognition of the physician-patient privilege. 23 Since a psychiatrist is a
physician specializing in the treatment of mental and emotional
,disorders, in theory there has been a limited psychotherapist privilege since the various states' adoption of statutory physician-patient
privileges. 2 4 In addition, over two-thirds of the states presently
,and the honor of the attorney rather than for the apprehension of his client."
Id. § 2290 (emphasis in original). During the eighteenth century, however,
that rationale gave way to the view, which still prevails today, that such a
privilege is necessary to promote open and candid communication between an
attorney and his client. 2 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra, § 207; 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2290; Saltzberg, Privileges and Professionals:Lawyers
,and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 604 (1980); Comment, Privileged Communications: A Case by Case Approach, 23 ME. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (1971).
See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). In Fisher, the
Supreme Court stated:
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full
disclosure to their attorneys. As a practical matter, if the client
knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained
from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the
absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his
lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.
Id. (citations omitted).
23. See N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. II, ch. VII, § 73 (1828). The statute provided:
[N]o person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery shall be
allowed to disclose any information which he may have acquired in
attending any patient, in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a
physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon.
Id., quoted in Comment, supra note 22, at 446 n.15. The New York statute
was passed as a public health measure to combat the high incidence of "dreadful" diseases. Id. at 446. It was presumed that people would be more willing
to seek medical treatment if they were protected from disclosure of their
condition. See Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical
Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 178 (1960); Comment, supra note 22, at 446.
Since the time of its adoption in New York, the physician-patient privilege has
been subject to the criticism that it impedes a court's ability to determine the
facts. Chief among the critics has been Wigmore. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 17, § 2380a. See also C. McComiu'cK, supra note 22, § 105; Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed By Closing the
Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943).
24. Several jurisdictions have a physician-patient privilege. See, e.g., ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1956); CAL. Evin. CODE § 994 (West Supp. 1981);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1973); GA. CODE
ANN. § 38-418(b)

(Supp. 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT.

§ 621-20.5

(1976);

IDAHO

CODE § 9-203 (1979); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1979-80); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-427 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-476 (West 1950); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2157 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1947);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (1972 & Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(5)
(Vernon Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 26-1-805 (1979); NEV. REV.

STAT. § 49.225 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:26 (Supp. 1979); N.J. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2A-84A-22.2 (West 1976); N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW § 4504 (McKinney
1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06 (1976); OHIO
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have enacted statutes which expressly extend the psychotherapistpatient privilege to other mental health practitioners besides the
25
physician-psychiatrist.
Wigmore stated that four criteria must be satisfied to justify an
evidentiary privilege: 1) the communication must result from a
confidence that the information will not be divulged; 2) the protection must be essential to maintaining the relationship; 3) the
relationship must be one which the community feels should be
encouraged; and 4) disclosure of the information must cause a
greater injury to the relationship than its benefit to the litigation. 25
Numerous commentators have related Wigmore's four elements to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, arguing that such a privilege
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02B (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503
1979); OR.REV. STAT. § 44.040(d) (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4 (Supp.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612 (Supp.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 905.04

(West
1980);
1978);
(West

1975); WYO. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1977).
The federal courts do not recognize a physician-patient privilege. See
United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853
(1976). A general physician-patient privilege also was rejected by the drafters
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. See Advis. Comm. Note to FED.
R. EVID. 504, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1972).
25. See, e.g.,

ALA.

CODE

§ 34-26-2

(1977)

(psychologist);

ALASKA

STAT.

§ 08.86.200 (1979) (psychologist or his associate); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1001,
72-1516 (1979) (psychotherapist; psychologist or psychological examiner); CAL.
EViD. CODE §§ 1012, 1014 (West 1966 & Supp. 1980) (psychotherapist); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-146(c), (f) (1979) (psychologist or psychiatrist); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, § 3518 (1975) (psychologist); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-418, 84-3118 (1981)
(psychiatrist; psychologist); IDAHO CODE §54-2314 (1979) (psychologist); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111, §5306 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (psychologist); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 25-33-1-77 (Burns 1974) (psychologist); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp.
1980) (general "professional confidence" statute); Ky. REV. STAT. §§319.111,
421.215 (1977) (psychologist; psychiatrist); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3734 (West
Supp. 1980) (health care professional); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-109
(1980) (psychiatrist or psychologist); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B
(West Supp. 1980) (psychotherapist); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1018 (1976)
(psychologist); MINN. STAT. ANN. §595.02 (West Supp. 1980) (psychologist);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-31-29 (1973) (psychologist); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 337.055
(Vernon Supp. 1980) (psychologist); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 26-1-807 (1979)
(psychologist); NEV. REV. STAT. §49-225 (1973) (psychologist or psychiatrist);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A 19 (1966) (psychologist); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:14B-28 (West 1978) (psychologist); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-9-18 (1978)
(psychotherapist or psychologist); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (1969) (psychologist);
N.D.R. EVID. 503 (1981) (psychotherapist); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4732.19
(Page 1977) (psychologist); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West 1979) (psychotherapist); Oa. REV. STAT. § 44.040(h) (1979) (psychologist); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §5944 (Purdon 1980) (psychologist); R.I. GEN. LAWS §5-37.3-4 (Supp.
1978) ("confidential health care information"); TENN. CODE ANN. §§24-1-207,
63-1117 (1977 & Supp. 1980) (psychiatrist; psychologist); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 58-25-8 (Supp. 1979) (psychologist); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.83.110 (1978)
(psychologist); WIS. STAT. § 905.04 (1975 & Supp. 1980) (psychologist); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-27-103 (1977) (psychologist).
26.

8 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 17, § 2285.
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should exist.27 In turn, the widespread adoption of the privilege in
one form or another indicates that the commentary has been persuasive with legislatures and courts.
Central to the theme of this commentary is the notion that the
psychotherapist-patient relationship is one that society desires to
foster and protect, and that without the confidentiality which the
privilege provides, many people will not seek therapeutic help.2 8
While there appears to be a myth that the mental health problem
is expanding in this country 29 and that consulting a psychotherapist
has become a middle-class fad,8 0 there is still a belief that people
react negatively upon learning that a person is undergoing psychotherapy. 3' The likelihood of discouraging people from consulting
a psychotherapist is even greater in child custody disputes, where
the party who needs help may fear that confidences revealed during
therapy will be used against them in later court appearances.3 2 In
this regard, therefore, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is different, and perhaps more necessary, than the physician-patient
privilege, since few people would avoid seeking medical help for
83
fear of disclosure.
27. See, e.g., Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Profession and the Law of
Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 611 (1964); Slovenko, supra
note 23, at 184; Comment, Confidential Communication to a Psychotherapist:
A New Testimonial Privilege, 47 Nw. L. REv. 384, 386-87 (1952); Comment,
The Psychotherapists'Privilege, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 297, 302-05 (1973).
28. See note 27 supra.
29. See Comment, The Psychotherapists'Privilege, supra note 27, at 300-01.
While the sense of an explosion in mental health problems may be more a
result of increased awareness and confrontation than a reality, the numbers
involved are still quite sobering. In 1973, for example, there were 5,249,000
reported episodes of mental health treatment, and in 1971, the total cost of
mental health treatment was $9.5 billion. Comment, The PsychotherapistPatient Privilege: Are Some Patients More Privileged Than Others?, 10 PAC.
L.J. 801, 802-03 (1979).
30. See London, Psychotherapy Boom: From the Long Couch for the Sick
to the Push Button for the Bored, 8 PsYcH. TODAY 62 (June 1974).
31. Professor Slovenko has observed that "[u]nlike the patient suffering an
organic illness, a person in psychotherapy, by and large, visits his psychiatrist
with the same secrecy that a man goes to a bawdy house." Slovenko, supra
note 23, at 188 n.46. While there appears to be little empirical data to indicate that publicity would discourage people from seeking help, there also
seems to be general agreement that for psychotherapy to be effective, the
confidentiality of disclosures must be assured. As stated by Robert M. Fisher:
"The relationship is rendered ineffective either because a person is deterred
from entering into it or because the person is frightened into non-disclosure
during its course, and, that the effect of such an absence of the privilege is
undesirable in light of the importance of the relationship to society." Fisher,
supra note 27, at 611.
32. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text infra.
33. It is interesting to note that the original goal of the physician-patient
privilege was to encourage people to seek help for "dreadful" diseases. See
note 23 supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 5 [1981], Art. 1

962

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

26: p. 955

To determine whether a privilege protects the psychotherapistpatient relationship, the obvious first step is to ascertain whether
any statute or rule of evidence applies to the psychotherapist 84 involved. Some statutory provisions are based on the physician-patient
privilege; absent separate statutory coverage, these do not include
psychotherapists other than psychiatrists." Other statutes limit the
privilege to the psychologist-patient relationship or encompass both
psychologists and psychiatrists.8 6 In a few states, a social worker
privilege provides a broader scope of protection than any of the
87
above three provisions.
As a result of the disparate scope of the privileges accorded to
the various mental health practitioners, an anomalous situation has
arisen in some states which have enacted more than one privilege
statute.88 When the language of the statutes differs, the psychologistpatient is often broader in scope than the physician-patient privilege.8 9 The scope of the psychologist privilege, for example, may
be defined as being the same as the attorney-client privilege,40 while
41
the physician privilege may be more narrowly drawn.
34. As used in this article, the term "psychotherapist" refers to psychiatrists,
psychologists, social workers, and other mental health practitioners.
35. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146d (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE

ANN. § 38-418 (1981).
36. See note 25 supra.
37. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1010(c)-(e) (West Supp. 1981) (clinical
social worker, school psychologist, and marriage, family and child counselor);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:8B-29 (West 1978) (marriage counselor); N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81) (certified social worker).
Pennsylvania's Divorce Code contains a privilege provision which states:
"Communications of a confidential character made by a spouse to an attorney,
or a qualified professional, shall be privileged and inadmissible in evidence in
any matrimonial cause unless the party concerned waives such immunity."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 703 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82). The term "qualified
professionals" is defined by the Divorce Code to include "marriage counselors,
psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, ministers, priests, or rabbis, or other
persons who, by virtue of their training and experience, are able to provide
counseling." Id. § 104. It has been stated, however, that "[ajlthough the
scope of this privilege is unclear, it would seem that it is inapplicable to
custody cases because . . . a custody dispute may not qualify as a 'marital
cause'....." Bertin & Klein, supra note 2, at 764 n.95.
38. See Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part II, 41
MINN. L. REV. 731, 739-40 (1957); Fisher, supra note 27, at 638-39.
39. See, e.g., Comment supra note 29, at 805-06; Comment, supra note 22,
at 448.
40. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 54-2314 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 319.111 (1977);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28 (West 1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4732.19 (Page

Supp. 1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5944 (Purdon 1980).
41. In Pennsylvania, for example, the psychologist privilege reads as
follows:
No person who has been licensed .. to practice psychology shall
be, without the written consent of his client, examined in any civil
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Since all psychotherapists, psychiatrists as well as nonphysicians,
perform services which are essentially similar in nature, 42 and all
rely on the trust and confidence of their patients, 43 a statute which
excludes one or more types of practitioners is inconsistent. A more
desirable approach would be to enact a statute which adopts a
44
functional definition of the class to which the privilege is to apply
or criminal matter as to any information acquired in the course of his

professional services in behalf of such client. The confidential relations and communications between a psychologist and his client shall
be on the same basis as those provided or prescribed by law between
an attorney and client.
42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5944 (Purdon 1980). Communications to psychiatrists, on the other hand, are protected by the physician-patient privilege,
which states:
No physician shall be allowed, in any civil matter, to disclose any
information which he acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, which shall tend to blacken the characterof the patient, without consent of said patient, except in civil matters brought by such
patient, for damages on account of personal injuries.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929 (Purdon 1980) (emphasis added).
The statutory requirement that a communication, to be privileged, must
be such that its disclosure would tend to "blacken the character" of the patient
has been narrowly interpreted by the Pennsylvania courts. See Miller v.
Colonial Refrigerated Transp. Inc., 81 F.R.D. 741, 743 (M.D. Pa. 1979), citing
Skruch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 284 Pa. 299, 302, 131 A. 186, 186 (1925)
(patient must be suffering from some "loathsome disease"). For discussion of
Miller, see note 229 infra. The physician-patient privilege is further qualified
by the provision that the physician may disclose information acquired in civil
matters brought by the patient for damages on account of personal injuries,
an exception which is not found in the psychologist-patient privilege statute.
For general discussion of the history and policy of the two privileges,
compare 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, §§2290-91 (attorney-client) with id.
§§ 2380-80a (physician-patient).
42. "Psychotherapy" has been defined as:
A method or system of alleviating or curing certain forms of disease,
particularly diseases of the nervous system or such as are traceable to
nervous disorders by suggestion, persuasion, encouragement, the inspiration of hope or confidence, the discouragement of morbid memories, associations, or beliefs, and other similar means addressed to the
mental state of the patient without (or sometimes in conjunction with)
the administration of drugs or other physical remedies.
BLAcK's LAW DicriONARY 1104 (5th ed. 1979).
43. Many commentators have voiced the view that there is a demonstrable
need and a sound rationale for confidentiality of communications between
clients and mental health professionals. See, e.g., Guttmacher & Weihofen,
Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32,
34-36 (1952); Louisell & Sinclair, Reflections on the Law of Privileged Communications: The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Perspective, 59 CALIF.
L. REV. 30, 52-55 (1971); Slovenko, supra note 23, at 184-96; Comment, supra
note 29, at 802-04; Comment, The Psychotherapists' Privilege, supra note 27,
at 303-04.
44. Fisher has described the class as those persons "seeking help in the

solution of a mental problem caused by psychological and/or environmental

pressures from another whose training and status are such as to warrant other
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Rather than providing protection based on the specific training of
the individual involved, the statute should extend the same evidentiary privilege to all client-practitioner relationships founded on
a psychotherapeutic function. 45 A psychotherapist-patient privilege
is essential to all such relationships, for, as Professor Slovenko has
stated:
The very essence of psychotherapy is confidential personal
revelations about matters which the patient is and should
be normally reluctant to discuss. Frequently, a patient in
analysis will make statements to his psychiatrist which he
would not make even to the closest member of his family.
The process involves prying into the most hidden aspects
of personality, a prying which discloses matters theretofore
unknown even to the conscious mind of the patient."

B. Application of the Statutory Privilege
Despite the existence of some type of psychotherapist-patient
privilege in most jurisdictions, the prevailing rule in child placement hearings is that the privilege does not prevent disclosure of
the testimony or records of a psychotherapist. Following traditional
privilege analysis, a majority of the courts addressing the question
have developed an analytically weak group of exceptions to the
privilege which, taken together, have virtually swallowed the rule.
The exceptions can be classified according to five interrelated
rationales: 1) the requested information was obtained by an examination for a purpose other than diagnosis or treatment; 2) the party
waived the privilege; 3) the therapist had an explicit statutory
duty to report the information; 4) the party introduced his or her
mental condition into controversy; and 5) the best interests of the
child override the claim of privilege.
1. Examination for Purpose Other than Diagnosis or Treatment
The first of these exceptions, arising when the psychotherapistpatient relationship results from an examination involving neither
diagnosis nor treatment, is consistent with the underlying rationale
of the privilege. The basis of the privilege is that the full beneficial
effect of the relationship can not be attained if the patient fears that
persons
at 617.
45.
at 820;
46.

confiding in him for the purpose of such help."

Fisher, supra note 27,

See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 27, at 637-41; Comment, supra note 29,
Comment, The Psychotherapists' Privilege, supra note 27, at 310-11.
Slovenko, supra note 23, at 184-85.
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revelations to the psychotherapist during the course of treatment
will be disclosed. 47 When the relationship is initiated for the purpose of examination only, the basis for the privilege is absent, since
the patient should be aware of its limited purpose and the possibility
of its subsequent disclosure. 48 This exception is widely accepted
49
and has been applied in civil, criminal, and child placement cases.
In addition, many of the statutes creating the privilege proscribe its
application when an examination is court-ordered. 50
2. Waiver
The second exception involves finding a waiver of the privilege
by the patient. 51 The clearest case of waiver is a signed release
executed by the patient5 2 A waiver has also been found where a
party agreed to the appointment of a neutral psychologist, 53 and
when a party did not object when a court granted an adversary the
opportunity to seek information from a psychotherapist.3 4
No fault can be found with this exception as long as the
waiver is knowingly made. In some cases, however, the waiver has
been anything but explicit. In re Fred J., 5 for example, involved
a custody dispute between the mother of two minor children and
the California Department of Public Assistance. The children were
47. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra.
48. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1044
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Lindsay v. Lipson, 367 Mich. 1, 4-5, 116 N.W.2d 60, 62-63
(1962). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 99; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra

note 17, § 2383.

49. See, e.g., Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 704-05, 177 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1970)

(criminal); Lindsay v. Lipson, 367 Mich. 1, 4-5, 116 N.W.2d 60, 62-63 (1962)
(civil); Rusecki v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 299, 316-18, 201 N.W.2d 832, 842-43 (1972)

(juvenile delinquency adjudication).

50. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146f(d) (West Supp. 1981); FLA.
§ 90.503(4)(b) (West 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 421.215(3)(b) (1972).

STAT. ANN.

51. Since the privilege is the patient's, not the psychotherapist's, the psychotherapist cannot assert the privilege if it has been waived by the patient. 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2386. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Romanowicz
v. Romanowicz, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 382, 385, 248 A.2d 238, 240 (1968).
52. See In Re Hochmuth, 251 N.W.2d 484, 490 (Iowa 1977).

53. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Black, 19 Or. App. 493, 497, 528 P.2d
130, 132 (1974).
54. Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. App. 1977).

For

discussion of Critchlow, see notes 79-88 and accompanying text infra. Cf. FED.
R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2) (requesting and obtaining report of examination waives
privilege regarding other examinations of same condition).
55. 89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 152 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1979).
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declared dependents of the county juvenile court, but initially were
permitted to remain in the custody of their mother.5 6 Subsequently,
removal petitions were filed by the Department of Public Assistance,
and the court ordered that the minors be taken from their mother.6 7
While the children were in the mother's custody, she had them
examined by two private psychiatrists, rejecting a social worker's
suggestion that the children be taken to the county mental health
clinic.58 At the removal hearing, the trial court permitted the privately retained psychiatrists to testify over the mother's and the
childrens' objections.59 On appeal by the mother, the court held
that to the extent that the mother might have had a privilege, she
had waived it by her disclosure or consent to disclosure of the communications.60 The fact that the mother had signed releases authorizing one of the psychiatrists to disclose information to various
social agencies, and had, on two occasions, directed him to send
reports to such agencies, was found to constitute a waiver., 1
The reasoning in Fred J. appears sound if analyzed under
traditional privilege analysis. Once the privileged communication
is divulged to anyone, whether deliberately or by accident, the
privilege no longer exists.62 The concern with applying traditional
analysis in this type of case, however, is that it discourages action
which is beneficial to the children - obtaining needed psychotherapy. Under these circumstances, reliance on a signed general
waiver may actually be contrary to the best interests of the child
since the protection of confidential psychotherapist-patient communications, with its attendant encouragement to seek help, may
better serve the best interests of the child in the long run. This is
especially true whenever the psychotherapist is privately retained,
as in Fred J., since the patient's expectation of privacy is greater
56. Id. at 172, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
57. Id. at 172-73, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 328.

The petitions, filed eight months

after the initial order, sought to modify the earlier order on the ground that
the mother had not effectively provided for the minors' welfare. Id.
58. Id. at 178, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
59. Id. At the hearing, although attorneys for both the mother and the
children objected, only the mother appealed. Id. at 178-79, 152 Cal. Rptr.
at 332.
60. Id. at 179, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 332. The court expressed doubt, but did
not decide, whether the mother would have had a privilege to object, separate
from that of the children, absent her waiver. Id.
61. Id.

62. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 101; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 17, § 2381.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss5/1

12

Guernsey: The Psychotherapist - Patient Privilege in Child Placement: A Rel

-1980-81]

PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN CHILD PLACEMENT

in such a case than when a social worker, the court's agent, arranges
63
for the therapy.
.3. Therapist'sDuty to Report
A third exception to the privilege arises when the psychotherapist has a legal duty to report the information. This most
,commonly occurs in child abuse actions. Indeed, a majority of the
,states have enacted statutory provisions which expressly adopt the
exception. 64
4. Mental Condition in Controversy
The fourth, and perhaps the most common, rationale for denying an evidentiary privilege in placement determinations is that the
proceedings are such that the mental condition of the parties is an
issue. This circumstance, known as the "tender exception," is
recognized by both the case law, 5 and statutory provisions."6
The rationale for the tender exception is derived from what
.has been called the "patient-litigation exception." Simply stated,
the latter exception provides that if a party puts his physical or
-mental condition into issue, such as in a suit for personal injuries,
he cannot then preclude an opposing party's inquiry into that
-condition by asserting a privilege.6 7 This exception has been uniformly applied as a justification for broad discovery of mental and
63. For discussion of other cases focusing on the issue of privately-retained
psychiatric help, see notes 79-80 & 99-104 and accompanying text infra.
64. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(a) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(4)
.(West 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(b)(4) (Supp. 1978). See generally Light,
Abused and Neglected Children in America: A Study of Alternative Policies,
-inTHE RIGHTS OF CHtLREN 198, 203 (1974); Paulsen, Parker & Adelman, Child
.Abuse Reporting Laws - Some Legislative History, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 482

41966).

65. See In Re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829
.(1970). For discussion of Lifschutz, see notes 166-69 and accompanying text
infra.
66. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
ch. 233, § 20B (West Supp. 1980).

§ 9-109 (1980); MASS.

GEN.

LAWS ANN.

67. See, e.g., 8 J. WiGMoRE, supra note 17, § 2389; Louisell & Sinclair, supra
:note 43, at 41-43. An apt description of the tender exception rationale has
been articulated by the California Supreme Court:

The whole purpose of the [physician-patient] privilege is to preclude the humiliation of the patient that might follow disclosure of
his ailments. When the patient himself discloses those ailments by
bringing an action in which they are in issue, there is no longer any
reason for the privilege .... He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
,City of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 232, 231 P.2d 26, 28
.(1951).
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physical examinations under Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 08 and its state counterparts. 9
While this exception has been widely accepted, its interpretation has been anything but consistent. The major problem is determining what actions constitute placing the treated condition in
issue.70 A Massachusetts statute, for example, states that the mental
condition of the child and of the proposed custodian may be issues
in the child placement decision. 71 Several other states define the
standard to make the mental condition of the parties necessarily
72
an issue.
Several Florida decisions present an interesting example of the
difficult task of grappling with the common law rule in custody
cases that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is waived if the issue
of a party's mental condition is raised. In Roper v. Roper 7 8 a dissolution of marriage action in which both parents sought custody
of their minor children, the wife appealed from an order requiring
her psychiatrist to testify at a discovery deposition. 74 Reversing
that order, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida con68. Rule 35(a) provides:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group)
of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of
a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may
order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a
physician or to produce for examination the person in his custody or
legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause
shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties
and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of
the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
69. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. Paoc. CODE §2032 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110A, § 215(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82).
70. Most obvious is the situation of psychiatric or medical treatment directly
related to the alleged incident for which the party is seeking recovery - the
classic example being the malpractice suit in which the patient cannot allege
that the physician or therapist caused damage and then deny him the opportunity to refute the allegations by asserting the physician-patient privilege.
See, e.g., Post v. State, 580 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1978); State v. Ramirez, 116 Ariz.
259, 569 P.2d 201 (1977).
71. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, §20B(e) (West Supp. 1981) (trial
judge, in exercise of discretion, determines that psychotherapist has evidence
bearing on ability to provide suitable custody).
72. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(a)(5) (Supp. 1980) (to determine
best interests of the child, court shall consider mental and physical health of all
individuals involved); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2353(b)(2) (Supp. 1978) (in involuntary termination of parental rights cases, judge shall consider physical,
mental, and emotional health of all individuals involved to degree that welfare
of the child affected).
73. 336 So. 2d 654 (Fla. App. 1976).
74. Id. at 655-56.
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-cluded: "The psychiatrist-patient privilege would be seriously compromised if a treating psychiatrist could be required to testify
..against his patient in any divorce proceeding where the issue of
child custody [is] raised." 71 The court stressed that although the
mental condition of a parent is relevant in determining the best
interests of the children, a party seeking custody does not thereby
waive the psychiatrist-patient privilege.7 6 Recognizing a need to
.maintain a balance between determining the mental health of the
parents and maintaining confidentiality between a treating psychiatrist and his patient, the court held that as an alternative to breaching the privilege, the wife could be ordered to submit to a compulsory psychiatric examination. 77 Addressing the issue of when
..one's mental condition is raised, the Roper court indicated that if
the wife had offered testimony of her treating psychiatrist to prove
her parental fitness, then she would have waived her psychiatrist78
,patient privilege.
A year after Roper, the Third District Court of Appeal of
Florida also addressed the waiver issue in a similar case. In Critchlow v. Critchlow,79 a wife's petition for dissolution of marriage
.alleged that she was a fit and proper person to have custody of the
.couple's child.8 0 After the wife's subsequent commitment to a hospital for psychiatric treatment, the husband sought custody of the
,child because of his wife's mental condition.'
Thereafter, the
parties agreed to the appointment of a psychiatrist to examine the
husband, wife, and child, and render a professional opinion as to
which party was best suited to have custody.8 2 The wife had also
;stipulated to an agreement authorizing the deposition of her childhood physician, and failed to object to a court order authorizing
75. Id. at 656. The court reasoned that successful therapy and treatment
-were dependent upon the psychiatrist's ability to assure his patient of confidentiality. Id.
76. Id.

77. Id. at 657. Rejecting the husband's assertion that the treating psychi,atrist's testimony would be more probative, the Roper court noted that
Florida's tribunals have "long relied upon the testimony of court-appointed
.psychiatrists to determine a person's mental condition." Id. at 656.
78. In so finding, the court was construing a Florida statute providing:
"There shall be no privilege . . . [when] the patient introduces his mental
.condition as an element of his claim or defense." Id. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
.§ 90.242(3)(b) (1975).
79. 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. App. 1977).
80. Id. at 454.
81. Id. The husband amended his original counter petition, which had
-not challenged his wife's prayer for custody of their child. Id.
82. Id.
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depositions of her treating psychiatrists. 83 After the husband was
awarded temporary custody of the child, however, the wife sought
and obtained a protective order against taking the depositions.8 4
In reversing the lower court, the appellate court held that the
wife had waived any privilege with respect to the testimony of her
treating psychiatrists and childhood physician by stipulating to one
of the depositions and failing to object to the court orders authorizing the others.8 5 The wife's statement in her petition that she was
a fit person, combined with her agreement to an examination by a
psychiatrist, was seen as a tender by the wife of the issue of her
mental condition within the statutory exception. 6 The Critchlow
court distinguished Roper on the ground that in the later case the
wife's voluntary commitment had made her mental health highly
relevant to a determination of the best interest of the child, and,
under such circumstances, the psychiatrist-patient privilege could
7
not be invoked.
While it is difficult to assess the weight accorded this reasoning,
given the holding that there was clearly a waiver, it is of value to
note that in determining when the issue of a party's mental health
is raised, Critchlow looked to the generalized allegations in the
petition and to stereotyped stigma attached to former patients of
mental hospitals. 8 The problem with concluding that the mental
health of a party becomes relevant once there has been a voluntary
commitment to a mental hospital is that it presupposes that one's
past mental condition in some way affects parental abilities. This
is not necessarily true.
The fact of a party's commitment to a mental hospital would
not normally be privileged information." Absent a determination
that the commitment in some way relates to the individual's parental
abilities, blanket disclosure penalizes him for seeking help. This is
exactly what the privilege was meant to avoid. Indeed, a compelling reason for the adoption of the first physician-patient privilege
was to encourage people to seek help.90
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 454-55.

For the text of Florida's psychiatrist-patient privilege,

see note 78 supra.

87. 347 So. 2d at 455.
88. Id. at 454-55.
89. See C. McCoamicx, supra note 22, § 100.
90. See note 23 supra.
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The court's reliance on the allegations of the petition that the
mother was unfit is also questionable. As a practical matter, there
is little difference between such reliance and the situation in which
a mother's petition states that she is fit, thus avoiding waiver of the
privilege. Almost assuredly, during either direct or cross-examination of the mother, an affirmative statement of fitness is going to be
made, a fact which is clearly material and necessary. It makes little
sense to base a legal distinction on whether fitness is first mentioned
at trial or in a petition, or by the petitioner or the respondent.
The difficulty with the Roper and Critchlow analysis is seen in
the third of the Florida cases, Mohammad v. Mohammad,91 in which
the First District Court of Appeal of Florida attempted to reconcile
Roper and Critchlow. In Mohammad, a divorce and custody action,
a husband sought either to examine the psychiatric records of his
wife or call her psychiatrist as a witness.9 2 The wife sought to invoke the psychiatrist-patient privilege. 9 Stating that while it agreed
with the decision in Critchlow, where the party's mental condition
was clearly in issue, the court concluded that that was not the case
in Mohammad.94 The difference, according to the court, was that in
Critchlow the mother alleged that she was a fit person and was subsequently admitted to a mental hospital, while in Mohammad the
husband raised the issue of his wife's mental condition in his original
petition. 95 The court held that the wife's denial of unfitness did
not raise the issue, and thereby waive the privilege, reasoning that
the privilege would be meaningless if the opposing party could in
this manner always inject the issue into litigation. 96
Mohammad seems to follow a logical approach, but ultimately
has the same shortcoming as Critchlow. Practically speaking, it
makes no difference when the issue is raised or by whom. Whether
the mother filed the petition or not, a parent's mental condition is
always material, and, as will be discussed below, 97 some alternate
method should be employed to determine whether that issue can be
raised. Who has custody of the child before litigation is often unrelated to the child's best interests. But under the rationale of
91. 358 So. 2d 610 (Fla. App. 1978).
92. Id. at 612. The trial court did make available the reports of a courtappointed psychiatrist who had examined both parties. Id. at 611.
93. Id. at 612. The trial judge sustained the privilege, refusing to permit
the psychiatrist to testify. Id.
94. Id. at 613.
95. Id. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
96. 358 So. 2d at 613.
97. See section IIC infra.
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Mohammad, the party having custody of the children needs only to.;
remain silent and the issue of the party's mental fitness will be held
not to have been raised. 98
Courts holding that the nature of child custody proceedingsautomatically constitutes a tender of the issue are more analytically
consistent than the Florida line of cases. Typical of such cases is,
Atwood v. Atwood,99 decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court. In
Atwood, a couple with three children was divorced and custody of
the children was awarded to the mother. 00 After the mother remarried, she, her new husband, and her new husband's son began
consulting two private psychiatrists, and her first husband sought
custody of his children.' 0' When her first husband proposed to take
the psychiatrists' depositions, the mother moved for a protective
02
order, invoking Kentucky's psychiatrist-patient privilege statute.'
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of
the protective order, relying on later statutes which directed courts
to examine the mental health of the parties and the children in a
custody case.' 0' The court stated that whenever custody is disputed,
the persons involved subject themselves to "extensive and acute
investigation," and that by seeking custody in the original divorce
98. An Illinois appellate court has reached a result similar to Mohammad
in a case involving a child dependency action. See In re Westland, 48 Ill.
App. 3d 172, 362 N.E.2d 1153 (1977). In Westland, a mother sought to exclude
the testimony of a psychiatrist and psychiatric nurse. Id. at 174-75, 362 N.E.2d
at 1155. In reversing the lower court's admission of the testimony, the court
limited the exceptions to the psychiatrist-patient privilege to those expressly
provided in the Illinois statute. Id. at 176-77, 862 N.E.2d 1156. One of those
exceptions applies when a patient introduces his mental condition as an
element of his case. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1975). By failing to
apply this exception, the court implicitly rejected the attenuated analysis of
cases holding that by seeking custody a party automatically raises the mental
fitness issue. The Westland court also expressly rejected the argument that
the best interests of the child override the psychiatrist-patient privilege. 48
Ill. App. 3d at 176-77, 362 N.E.2d at 1156. For an opposing view, see notes
99-105 and accompanying text inIra. The court's blind adherence to a rigid
rule of construction is no more sound, however, than blind adherence to a
doctrine based upon who first raises the issue. In both instances, a relevancy
analysis is more sound. See Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial
Privilege: A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. L. REV. 649 (1974).
99. 550 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1976).
100. Id. at 465.
101. Id. at 466.
102. Id. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.215 (1975).
103. 550 S.W.2d at 467. See Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 403.270, .340 (Supp. 1980).
The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the statutory exception to the
psychiatrist-patient privilege, in which the patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense, had been met by operation of
law by the passage of a statute dealing with award of custody. 550 S.W.2d

at 467.
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action, the mother had placed her mental condition in issue. 1°4 An
affirmative statement of fitness by the party was not necessary under
this automatic tender analysis.
The Kentucky court's analysis is more sound than the Florida
-courts', but an even better approach would be to cast the issue as
one of materiality 105 rather than as a tender exception. The inquiry in a custody dispute is so wide-ranging that, under the traditional factors which determine materiality, the mental condition of
the parent would always be material.106 The issue, therefore, is not
really one of tender.
5. Child's Best Interests Override the Privilege
Once it is recognized that the emotional condition of a potential
custodian is always material, a more productive inquiry can begin
and the basic question of whether the privilege should apply in this
type of case can be addressed directly. For those desiring to deny
the privilege, this would at least lead to a more intellectually sound
basis for denial; it could be said that the nature of the proceeding
is such that concern for the welfare of the child simply outweighs
any policy justification for the privilege.
Recognition that honoring the privilege would conceal information important to the determination of the case is the fifth basis
for an exception to the privilege in placement decisions. This
exception was adopted in the New York case of Perry v. Fiumano,0 7
a custody proceeding in which a mother, whose son was in the
,custody of his father, sought the records of a certified social worker
seen by the father. 08 Recognizing that the interests of the child
were paramount, the court concluded:
104. 550 S.W.2d at 467.
105. Materiality involves the question of whether a given proposition is
provable in a case. Whether a proposition is provable can depend on many
different factors, such as pleadings, pretrial orders, stipulations, and statutes.
Materiality does not depend on who brings the lawsuit, since a proposition
can become material through responsive pleadings. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 22, § 185; James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF.
L. REV. 689, 692-93 (1941). See generally Weihofen, supra note 7, at 77.
106. See James, supra note 105, at 689-91.
107. 61 A.D.2d 512, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1978). The Perry court noted
that several lower courts have limited the privilege in cases involving the
welfare and best interests of children. Id. at 517, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 385. See,
e.g., In re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184, rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. In re Klug, 32 A.D.2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1969); In re DoVidio,
56 Misc. 2d 79, 288 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1968); People ex rel. Chitty v. Fitzgerald, 40
Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1963).
108. 61 A.D.2d at 515-16, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 384. The court noted that since
the counseling center which the father had attended provided the services of
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is [not] an impermissible encroachment upon the legislative function to hold that where it is demonstrated that
invasion of protected communications between a party, a
physician, psychologist, or social worker is necessary and
material to a determination of custody, the rule of privilege
protecting such communications must yield.1 09
The court also noted that elimination of the privilege altogether might influence a parent to forego needed psychiatric help,
and thus required a balancing of the two considerations to determine if the importance of the information outweighed the privilege. 110 To reconcile these conflicting concerns, the court held
that the party seeking disclosure must make a showing of necessity
beyond mere conclusory statements, a test which the mother failed
to meet in Perry."'
The reasoning of Perry was followed in the subsequent New
York case of State ex rel. Hickox v. Hickox, 12 which involved a
motion to quash a subpoena for the production of a mother's psychiatric records in a custody proceeding." 3 Reversing the lower court's
grant of the motion,"14 the appellate court established the following
factors for the trial judge to consider in deciding whether to release
the information: 1) whether any psychiatric testimony has already
been offered or proposed; 2) whether there has been a waiver of the
privilege; and 3) whether the psychotherapy records are material
and necessary or whether there is sufficient information without
them."85
physicians, psychologists, and social workers, three district privileges were
involved. Id.
109. Id. at 518-19, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
110. Id. at 519, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 386. The court indicated a concern for
the "chilling effects" of the possibility of later disclosure of confidences, and
concluded that "these privileges may not cavalierly be ignored or lightly cast
aside." Id.
111. Id. at 519-20, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87.
112. 64 A.D.2d 412, 410 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1978).
113. Id. at 413, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
114. Id. at 415, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 84. The court noted that the denial of a
motion to quash is not the equivalent of an order of disclosure since a subpoena
duces tecum merely requires that the requested records be brought to court so
that the trial judge may take appropriate action with respect to disclosure.
Id. at 413-14, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83.
• 115. Id. at 415-16, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 84. This is similar to the approach
taken by the New Jersey Superior Court in D. v. D., 108 N.J. Super. 149, 260
A.2d 255 (1969). D. was a divorce and custody proceeding in which the
husband sought medical and psychiatric records relating to his wife's hospital
commitment. Id. at 151-52, 260 A.2d at 256. In response to the wife's assertion
that the physician-patient privilege was absolute, the court stated that the
interests of the children were paramount and that the privilege must yield to
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Such an approach has more merit than one relying on a conclusion that the best interests of the child automatically outweigh
any privilege.

Indeed, Hickox suggests an analysis that could be

applied to all five exceptions, and is similar to the approach embodied in Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 116 For
an adverse party to be required to submit to a physical or mental
examination under Rule 35(a), the mental or physical condition of
the party must be in controversy and good cause must be shown.1 17
The in controversy requirement would seem to require more
than mere materiality, perhaps affirmative allegations of emotional
disability.11 8 The good cause showing, essentially the test adopted
in Hickox, requires more than mere logical relevancy.1 1 9 Indeed,
the test articulated by the Hickox court is very close to the United
States Supreme Court's own interpretation of the good cause lan20
in which the
guage of Rule 35(a) in Schlagenhauf v. Holder,1
Court stated:
[T]he "in controversy" and "good cause" requirements of
Rule 35 . . . . are not met by mere conclusory allegations
of the pleadings - nor by mere relevance to the case - but

require an affirmative showing by the movant that each
condition as to which the examination is sought is really
and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for
this higher concern. Id. at 152, 260 A.2d at 256-57. Thus, the husband was
allowed to subpoena the documents. Id. at 152, 260 A.2d at 257. They were
not to be made part of the record, however, but were limited in use to an
inspection by the court. Id. The court also required a psychiatric evaluation
to determine the present mental condition of the parties, and stated that if
the wife refused to submit to the evaluation, it would deny her claim to the
statutory privilege. Id. at 154, 260 A.2d at 257-58. The court wrote:
The court's primary concern is the welfare of infant children, and
the need to resolve this issue in their best interests may outweigh
policy reasons for certain technical rules of evidence where the court
in its discretion can find no acceptable alternative and where the information sought is indispensable to a proper determination of the
custody issue.
Id. Thus, as in Hickox, a good-cause showing was required for disclosure.
116. For the text of Rule 35 (a), see note 68 supra.
117. See note 68 supra.
118. It must, of course, be recognized that Rule 35(a) is concerned with
examination, not treatment, and therefore the privilege would not apply. Seenotes 67-68 and accompanying text supra. The purpose behind Rule 35, however, calls to mind the present conflict between intrusion into a person's
personal life and the need to obtain facts. See, e.g., 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERA. PRAGricE & PROCEDURE 670-80 (1970); Barnet, Compulsory Medical
Examination Under the Federal Rules, 41 VA. L. REV. 1059 (1955); Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1022-26 (1961).
119. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text supra.
120. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
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ordering each particular examination. Obviously, what
may be good cause for one type of examination may not be
so for another. The ability of the movant to obtain
the
121
desired information by other means is also relevant.
Some federal courts will deny a Rule 35(a) request if the information sought is available from other sources, 22 thus, in essence, apply123
ing a necessity requirement similar to that espoused in Hickox.
C. Suggested Deductive Analysis
The fact that both the Rule 35 and Hickox tests are based on a
requirement that something more than logical relevancy must be
,demonstrated suggests that relevancy analysis is a good place to begin
24
in articulating an appropriate analytical approach to privileges'
Logical relevancy is the question of whether the existence of a given
fact tends to prove a proposition before the court. 25 In other words,
does the evidence make the conclusion towards which it is directed
"more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"? 128 Judges and jurors generally use inductive reasoning to
decide relevancy.u 7 For example, their reasoning might be: C received burns while in the custody of M; M, therefore, is unfit to
28
have custody.
It has been effectively shown, however, that logical relevancy is
better evaluated by transforming inductive reasoning into deductive
-quasi-syllogistic form. 29 In such a transformation, not only are the
evidence and conclusion explicitly stated, but so is the proposition
towards which the evidence is offered. Assuming the existence of
121. Id. at 118. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 118, at 672-73.
122. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 118, at 673 n.51.
123. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
124. This approach is also consistent with Professor Slovenko's position
that privilege is really a question of relevancy because courts allow the intrusion in all circumstances. R. SLOVENKO, supra note 5, at 67.
125. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 185. Logical relevancy must be
distinguished from materiality. Logical relevancy is concerned with whether
evidence is probative of a proposition, while materiality asks whether a prop-osition is properly provable in a particular case. For discussion of this distinction, see id.; James, supra note 105, at 690-92.
126. FED. R. EvID. 401.
127. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevance - A Conflict in Theory, 5
VAND. L. REv. 385, 389 (1952).
128. See J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 9-46 (1937); James,

.supra note 105, at 694-700.
129. The seminal piece on the value of transformation is James, supra
note 105, in which Professor James refuted Wigmore's position that transformation was not helpful. See id. at 694-99.
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logical relevancy, such a transformation also enables an evaluation
of probative weight, that is, how more or less probable does the evidence make the conclusion? 180
This transformation can be viewed in either of two ways: It can
be characterized as one proposition towards which the evidence is
directed, or it can be seen as a series of intermediate propositions
leading to an ultimate conclusion.1 31 Viewing the transformation
as one quasi-syllogism, one proposition is the minor premise. Taking the burn example, the following quasi-syllogism results:
When a child receives burns while living with his
mother, it is likely that the mother is unfit to have custody.
C received burns while living with M.
M, therefore, is unfit to have custody.
Determination of logical relevancy rests on acceptance of the
proposition which in the inductive form was left unstated. The
question then becomes whether the evidence is probative of the
proposition. From a logical standpoint, few could deny that the
existence of burns makes it more or less probable that M is unfit to
be a custodian. But, by questioning the validity of the proposition,
the probative weight can also be examined. 13 2 The closer the
proposition, evidence, and conclusion come to a valid syllogism,
the more probative is the evidence. 13 3 Clearly, if the proposition
is phrased as "usually" the mother is unfit rather than "sometimes",
the evidence is more probative.
The probative value, or certainty, can be increased or decreased
by adding facts to the proposition. The existence of other testimony, therefore, will affect the probative weight of the evidence
being considered. 18 4 For example, additional evidence might change
the major premise to:
A child who receives cigarette burns on its buttocks
while living with a mother who smokes usually has a
mother who is an unfit custodian.
130. Id.
131. Compare id. with MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE 183-88 (1961).
and Trautman, supra note 127, at 389.
132. There would, of course, be an additional proposition that it is not
in the best interests of the child to be in the custody of an unfit mother.
133. James, supra note 105, at 698-99.
134. Id. Another example from a different field would be a robbery case
in which evidence that the defendant tried to escape when he was arrested
was presented to the jury. With the defendant's attempted escape as the
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The additional facts might very well make the evidence more probative, perhaps changing "likely" to "usually."
If we view the transformation as a series of intermediate propositions, the following can be stated based on the evidence of burns:
A child who has burns is likely to have been burned
by someone.
A child who has been burned by someone is likely to
have been burned by someone the child lives with.
A child who is burned by someone with whom the
child lives has a custodian who either burned him or did
not provide sufficient supervision to protect him.
A custodian who either burned the child or failed to
supervise the child properly is unfit to have custody of a
child.
The remoteness of the initial proposition from the final proposition goes to probative weight: the more remote the evidence and
first proposition are from the final proposition, the less probative
value the evidence has. 35 Again, probative weight can be increased
or decreased by attacking the validity of each proposition by adding
facts.
D. The Application of Deductive Analysis to the
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
The deductive form of analysis has direct application to privileges. Those who would require blanket access to psychotherapists'
records support a proposition that is analytically weak, and that provides little support for invading the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Assuming that the evidence sought to be introduced is a
psychotherapist's records or testimony, the proposition is:
minor premise, the major premise is that a person who flees when arrested
s-hows consciousness of guilt. The question then becomes whether the evidence, or minor premise, is probative of the proposition, or major premise.
The more likely the proposition becomes, the more relevant is the evidence.
For example, the evidence is more relevant if flight always shows consciousness
of guilt than if flight only sometimes shows consciousness of guilt. The time
between the robbery and the arrest may affect the certainty, as may the distance
of the place of arrest from the scene of the robbery. For example, the evidence
would be more probative if the arrest took place fifteen minutes after the
robbery and one block away than if the arrest were three months later and in
another city.
135. James, supra note 105, at 698-99.
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A person who has undergone psychotherapy in the
past is likely to have given information to the therapist
that is relevant to his mental capacity to have custody of a
child.
The question that then arises is whether the evidence is probative
of the proposition. Viewed alone, the mere existence of a psychotherapist-patient relationship provides scant support for the existence
of relevant information.
If this single proposition is broken into its intermediate components, the remoteness of the ultimate proposition is graphically
illustrated. Beginning with the fact that someone has undergone
psychotherapy, the propositions are:
A person who has undergone psychotherapy probably
revealed information during therapy which reflects on his
ability to have custody of children.
This information will probably be evaluated by the
psychotherapist.
The therapist will probably record this evaluation.
This record will probably reflect present ability.
This record will probably be in a form useful to the
court.
Viewed in either of these forms, the weakness of the justification for breaching the privilege can be seen because of the low
probative weight of the evidence. But, as with all questions of
relevancy, if we add facts to the proposition (major premise), we
increase the probative value. The more likely the proposition, the
more probative the evidence; when the proposition becomes 100
percent true, there is a deductive syllogism.
In this instance, additional facts of particular relevance might
include whether the therapy was related to the child-parent relationship or whether the prior therapy is required to interpret present
actions. 136 The proposition must have more certainty than that
required for mere logical relevancy since, absent an explicit exception, the legislature has expressed a desire to protect the communication beyond mere relevancy. 13
In short, the necessary
136. The latter determination could be made through the use of a courtappointed psychotherapist. See notes 225-31 and accompanying text infra.
137. See Neuman v. Neuman, 377 A.2d 393, 398 (D.C. App. 1977) (construing Rule 35 good cause requirement as additional to relevancy requirement
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demonstration comes close to a Rule 35(a) good cause showing or to
the New York test articulated in Hickox, which focuses on whether
the disclosure is both "necessary and material." 138
The suggested deductive analysis not only facilitates a consistent approach to the privilege in general, but also helps to provide a more logical explanation of each exception. The treatment
versus examination exception is perhaps the clearest example. 18
The information added to the proposition which justifies the breach
of the privilege, or the good cause shown, is not information about
past mental condition, but rather information pertaining to present
mental condition. The examination focuses on specific questions
concerning an individual's capacity to have custody, and there is
general agreement that the examination is of benefit to the custody
determination. 140 The analytic proposition actually becomes:
The records of a person who undergoes a psychological examination to determine his fitness to take custody
of a child will contain information which will aid that
determination.
This proposition comes much closer to always being true, and while
the word "will" perhaps should be replaced by "probably" it is clear
that the justification for breaching the privilege is substantial.
The implied waiver exception would also hold up under deductive analysis.14 ' Indeed, in many instances, the good cause showing would be satisfied by an implied waiver. When the waiver is
implied from a release given to another agency, as in In re FredJ.,14Z
the fact that information was useful there, or at least that the party
thought it would be, may very well add strength to the good cause
of Rule 26(b)).

See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 35(a); notes 68 & 116-23 and

accompanying text supra.
138. See notes 112-23 and accompanying text supra.
139. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
140. See R. SLOVENXO, supra note 5, at 363-75. But see E. FERscH, LAW,
PSYCHIATRY, AND THE COURTS 90-91 (1979). See generally Bradbrook, The Role

of Judicial Discretion in Child Custody Adjudication in Ontario, 21 U.
L.J. 402 (1971).

TORONTO

141. An explicit waiver, of course, presents no problem since no objection
regarding access would be raised, other than that the waiver was improperly
obtained. There would still remain, however, the question of whether what
was revealed was relevant to the suit. For discussion of the waiver exception, see
notes 51-63 and accompanying text supra.
142. For discussion of Fred J., see notes 55-63 and accompanying text supra.
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For example, the proposition in Fred J. could be

When a parent has previously provided records to an
agency which intended to aid the parent in providing care
for her children, those records are likely to provide information which is helpful to the custody determination.
The above premise not only permits closer examination of the
justification for the intrusion, but also suggests other evidence, such
as the nature and function of the agency, which might increase the
justification.
The duty exception, under which therapists are statutorily required to report certain information,14 4 establishes a direct connection between the privileged information and the issue in controversy.
Little basis exists for the argument that such information is unnecessary, since, at the time of reporting, the psychotherapist assumed
that there would not be another source of information. Thus,
under the proposed analysis, the proposition becomes one with
strong justification for breaching the privilege:
A psychotherapist who discovers in the course of
therapy that a child has been emotionally harmed by a
parent is likely to have information relevant to the parent's
fitness to have custody of the child.
The analytical problems surrounding tendering the issue are
also clarified by deductive analysis, which presupposes the materiality of the mental condition of the proposed custodian. Therefore, the question of who raises the issue can be dismissed and
attention turned to the logical relevancy questions. The question
becomes, as discussed, 145 one of viewing the surrounding factors that
potentially increase the probative value.
The concern with concealing relevant information as privileged
.needs little explanation. It is clearly founded on the recognition of
the need for relevant information, and, as such, would be encompassed by the general approach to access to records. 146
143. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.

144. For discussion of the duty exception, see note 64 and accompanying

text supra.

145. See section IIC supra.
146. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1976); Lora v. Board of Educ.
-of N.Y., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). For discussion of Whalen, see notes
159-65 & 189-96 and accompanying text infra. For discussion of Lora, see notes
179-87 and accompanying text infra.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE

A. Constitutional Basis
Constitutional analysis of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
has centered on whether the privilege is encompassed within the
right to privacy The constitutional right to privacy was first articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut,147 in which the United States
Supreme Court held invalid a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives. 148 The Court declared that the use of contraceptives fell
within a "zone of privacy," 149 and that Connecticut's statutory proscription was an unconstitutional invasion of that privacy right.15
The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed

the question of whether the constitutional right to privacy applies

to the psychotherapist-patient or physician-patient privileges. Several other courts which have confronted this issue, however, have
held that the privilege is strictly a legislative creation and has no
constitutional basis.' 51 The reasoning employed in these cases is

that the privacy right recognized in Griswold applies to familial
relationships, not the relationship between a psychotherapist and his
147. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Griswold decision has generated a great
deal of writing on the constitutional right of privacy. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 886 (1978); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475
(1967); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976). Comment, Due Process Privacy and the Path of
Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 469; see also Comment, The Privacy Act of 1974:
An Overview and Critique, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 667.
148. 381 U.S. at 480-86. The appellants in Griswold were a doctor and
an executive of the Planned Parenthood League. Id. at 480. Both had been
convicted of providing information and medical advice about contraceptives to
married persons. Id.
149. Id. at 485. Justice Douglas' majority opinion stated that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
these guarantees" and that these "guarantees creates zones of privacy." Id.
at 484.
150. Id. at 485. The basic analysis applicable to privacy cases was set
forth in Griswold. The right of privacy is a fundamental right and, as such,
requires a compelling state interest to justify any significant intrusion. Further, state regulation which invades the zone of privacy must be narrowly
circumscribed to meet the state's interest. Id. See Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1421 (1974).
151. See, e.g., State v. Enebak, - Minn. -, -, 272 N.W.2d 27, 30 (1978);
Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 334, 307 A.2d 503, 529 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 930 (1974).
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patient.1 52 A few courts, however, have found a constitutional basis
for the psychotherapist-patient privilege.158
Four questions must be addressed in analyzing whether the
psychotherapist-patient relationship in child placement decisions is
constitutionally protected under a right of privacy: 1) whether the
relationship itself is within an area protected by the Constitution;
2) whether there has been an infringement of such a protected area;
3) whether a state interest exists which is sufficient to justify the
intrusion; and 4) whether the intrusion was narrowly circumscribed.
1. Relationship Constitutionally Protected
Whether a particular activity is within the scope of the protection of the privacy right has been the central question addressed
by the Supreme Court since Griswold. Areas receiving protection
have included matters relating to marriage, 16 4 procreation,1 55 contra152. See Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970). In Felber, a
psychiatrist challenged the constitutionality of a state statute requiring medical
practitioners to report the names of drug-dependent persons to the state.
Id. at 86. The plaintiff claimed a violation of his right to privacy because of
the interference with his practice of medicine and the conflict created between
his professional duty and the demands of the statute. Id. at 87. The court
found no analogy between those "spheres of privacy which have previously won
constitutional protection" and that asserted by the plaintiff, and stated that
there was no indication that Griswold was "intended to constitutionalize the
privacy of other relationships, specifically that of physician and patient." Id.
at 88-89. The plaintiff's due process contentions were also rejected since no
specific deprivations of life, liberty or property were threatened. Id. at 89-90.
See also Moosa v. Abdalla, 248 La. 344, 351, 178 So. 2d 273, 276-77 (1965) (child
custody action; constitution does not guarantee physician-patient privilege);
Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 334, 307 A.2d 503, 529 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 930 (1974) (defendant in criminal proceeding had no constitutional
right to privileged communication with psychiatrist); State v. Enebak, - Minn.
-, -, 272 N.W.2d 27, 30 (1978) (testimony of doctor from state hospital at
which defendant confined held properly admitted; physician-patient privilege
is statutory rather than constitutional right and legislature may create
exceptions).
153. See notes 166-87 and accompanying text infra.
154. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (statute requiring
payment of court costs as precondition to access to state courts unconstitutional
denial of freedom of choice in marriage as applied to welfare recipients financially unable to pay costs of divorce action); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (statute prohibiting interrracial marriage denied due process by restricting freedom of choice in marriage without compelling state interest).
155. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (statute
requiring spouse's consent to abortion unconstitutional); Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973) (procedural requirements of abortion statute invalidated as
unnecessary restrictions of right of privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(right of privacy encompasses woman's decision to terminate pregnancy). But
see H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981) (state may require physician to
notify parents of unemancipated, immature minor seeking abortion).
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ception, 516 and decisions concerning child rearing and the education
of one's children.157 In addition, the privacy right has been extended'to freedom from governmental surveillance and intrusion. 158
Beyond this, the outer limits of the right remain unclear.
The relation between the physician-patient privilege and the
right of privacy was at issue in Whalen v. Roe. 59 In that case, the
United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
a New York statute requiring a physician to report to the State
Health Department each prescription written for a dangerous drug,
including the name of the person for whom the prescription was
written, violated the patient's right of privacy. 60 The Court stated
that the privacy right includes the individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters and the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions.'61 While holding that
New York's scheme did not constitute an impermissible invasion
due to its incorporation of procedural safeguards designed to prevent unwarranted dissemination of the information,8 2 the Court
did intimate that there was a privacy interest in the physician156. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (statute
allowing only pharmacists to sell contraceptives and prohibiting sales to persons
under age 16 unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right
to use contraceptives applied to unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute restricting married persons' right to use contraceptives unconstitutional). For discussion of Griswold, see notes 147-50 and
accompanying text supra.
157. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute requiring
children to be sent to public schools unreasonably interfered with parent's
liberty); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (prohibition against teaching
foreign language unconstitutionally infringed on liberty to make educational
decisions).
While many of these cases preceded the Griswold decision and did not
primarily rely on a privacy rationale, the Court has since cited them as
examples of the reach of the privacy right. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,

152-53 (1973).

158. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court
stated:
[T1he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
nowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
159. 429 U.S. 589 (1976).
160. Id. at 592-93. The state's objective was to identify abuse in the
prescription of certain drugs. Id. at 591-92. The patients claimed that disclosure of the information contained in the State Health Department computers
would stigmatize them as "drug addicts." Id. at 595.
161. Id. at 599-600.
162. Id. at 593-95. The prescription forms were to be destroyed after five

years. Id. at 593. The room in which the forms were kept was surrounded by
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985

patient relationship which was of constitutional dimension.168 Referring to individuals' interests in nondisclosure of personal matters
and independence in decision making, two areas of constitutional
protection, the Court stated that "the New York program does not,
on its face, pose a significantly grievous threat to either interest to
establish a constitutional violation." 164 The Court's reasoning can
be interpreted as recognizing the existence of a doctor-patient privacy right, but as finding no infringement of the right under the
circumstances. Indeed, as the Whalen Court stated:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in
the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information
in computerized data banks or other massive government
files . . ..
The right to collect and use such data for
public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances that
duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New York's statutory scheme . . . evidences a proper
concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in
privacy . ...
We simply hold that this record does not
establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by
10 5
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The argument that the right to privacy in the physician-patient
relationship implicit in the Whalen decision extends to the psychotherapist-patient relationship has been articulated in a series of
recent decisions of other courts. The seminal case recognizing the
existence of constitutional protection is In re Lifschutz.' 66 In holding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege had been waived in a
personal injury action because the plaintiff had placed his mental
condition in issue,1 67 the California Supreme Court expressed what
has become the basic argument for extending the right of privacy
to this relationship. Rejecting the assertion that the Griswold line
a wire fence and protected by an alarm system. Id. at 594. The statute prohibited disclosure of the identities of the patients, and violation was made a
criminal offense. Id. at 594-95.
163. Id. at 605.
164. Id. at 600.
165. Id. at 605-06.
166. 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970). For dissussion
of Lifschutz, including its constitutional dimensions, see generally Louisell 9C
Sinclair, supra note 43; Suarez & Hunt, The Patient-Litigant Exception in
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Cases: New Considerations for Alaska and
California Since In Re Lifschutz, I U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REv. 2 (1971).
167. 2 Cal. 3d at 439, 467 P.2d at 573, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
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of cases covered only family relationships, the Lifschutz court
stressed that the Griswold principle had an "open-ended quality" 168
which extended beyond marital relations to a broad spectrum of
interpersonal relationships including that of the psychotherapist and
his patient. 1 9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in In re B, 70 also addressed
the issue of whether a constitutional right of privacy protects the
psychotherapist-patient relationship,' 7' but failed to agree on a
majority approach to the subject. 72 An opinion written by the late
Justice Manderino stated that the right of privacy protects certain
"intimate relationships," such as family, marriage, and motherhood.78 Justice Manderino continued, indicating that the right
extends to other situations, such as the doctor's office, when necessary
74
to safeguard the right as it applies to those intimate relationships.
Emphasizing the intimate nature of the psychotherapeutic process
and the expectations of privacy which are therefore present, Justice
Manderino asserted that the individual's right of privacy must pre75
vail over the need of the court to obtain information.
The only other state supreme court decision affording the
psychotherapist-patient relationship constitutional protection under
a privacy right involved a state constitution. In Falcon v. Public
Offices Commission,"76 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a conflict of interest law violated an explicit provision of the Alaska Con168. Id. at 432, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
169. Id. at 432, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976).

See also Caesar v.

170. 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978).
171. Id. at 477, 394 A.2d at 422.

In B, a psychiatrist refused to release

the records of a patient whose son had been adjudicated a delinquent, and for
whom the court was attempting to determine proper placement. Id. at 475-76,
394 A.2d at 420-21.
172. The decision of the court was announced by Justice Manderino, with
Justice Larsen concurring and Justice O'Brien concurring only in the result.
Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion, stating that there was no need to
reach the constitutional question because the psychiatric records were protected by the statutory privilege. Id. at 487, 394 A.2d at 427 (Roberts, J.,
concurring). In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Eagen recognized that
there was a right of privacy to protect, but stated that the right should not
prevail because of the "important state interest in treatment and welfare of
juveniles." Id. at 494, 394 A.2d at 430 (Eagen, C.J., dissenting). Justice
Pomeroy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Nix joined, agreeing that
the statutory privilege was inapplicable and arguing that the constitutional
question had not been properly raised. Id. at 494, 394 A.2d at 430 (Pomeroy, J.,

dissenting).
173. Id. at 482, 394 A.2d at 424.

174. Id.
175. Id. at 486, 394 A.2d at 426.
176. 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977).
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stitution guaranteeing the right of privacy. 177 The Falcon court,
balancing the nature of the privacy interest involved and the
strength of the state interest requiring disclosure, held that the
potential embarrassment which might be caused by compliance with
78
the statute outweighed the state's interest in enforcing the statute.
In addition to these state court decisions, the scope of the
privacy right was further delineated by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York in Lora v. Board of
Education.179 In Lora, the court addressed the issue of whether a
constitutionally-based privilege precluded the plaintiffs in a civil
rights case from obtaining discovery of diagnostic and referral files
on emotionally handicapped children.8 0 Referring to Whalen, the
Lora court stated that the Supreme Court had identified three areas
protected by the right to privacy:
The first is the right of the individual to be free in his
private affairs from governmental surveillance and intrusion. The second is the right of an individual not to have
his private aflairs made public by the government. The
third is the right of an individual to be free in action,
thought, experience, and belief from governmental compulsion.1 81
The Lora court stated that it is the second interest, relating to "unwanted publicity," which is primarily involved in protecting an
individual from unwanted disclosure of treatment for emotional
disorders.8 2 Concluding that the privilege is of constitutional importance, the court explained that a person in therapy reveals
83
information which he would not normally reveal to other persons.
177. Id. at 480. See ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 22. The statute required
disclosure of the names of those patients from whom the doctor received more
than $100 annually. 570 P.2d at 470-71.
178. Id. at 480.
179. 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
180. Id. at 568. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district's standards
for identification, evaluation, and educational placement of emotionally handicapped children were applied in an arbitrary and racially discriminatory
manner. Id. In an effort to prove their allegations, the plaintiffs sought fifty
randomly selected student diagnostic files. Id.
181. Id. at 574, quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 599 n.24 (emphasis by
the Lora court). The Whalen court had taken its language from Kurland,
The Private I, U. Cm. MAGAZINE, 7, 8 (Autumn 1976). For discussion of

Whalen, see notes 159-65 and accompanying text supra; notes 189-96 and
accompanying text infra.
182. 74 F.R.D. at 574.
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As these revelations often expose the most intimate details of a
person's life, "their public disclosure may well strip him of much
of his own sense of human dignity." 184 Due to the uniquely confidential nature of psychotherapy, the court reasoned, freedom from
disclosure would encourage those in need of psychotherapy to seek
help and reveal fully the information essential to proper treatment.185
Although it recognized the existence of the privacy right in the
psychiatrist-patient relationship, the Lora court stated that this right
is not absolute.18 6 Again relying upon Whalen, the court applied a
balancing test and concluded that the balance of relevant factors.
8 7
was on the side compelling disclosure of the information sought.
2. Infringement of a Protected Area
Assuming that a psychotherapist-patient right of privacy exists,
the second question that must be answered is whether there has
been an infringement of that protected area. 88 In Whalen, the
Supreme Court held that the constitutionally protected area had
not been infringed. 89 Addressing the individual's interest in protection against disclosure of personal matters, the Court indicated
that the interference was insufficient to result in a constitutional
violation.'00 The Court found that the risk of negligent or deliberate public disclosure of the information was minimal,19 ' due to the
security provisions of the statute, 92 and that the concern over disclosure in a court hearing was unfounded, stating that "the remote
possibility that judicial supervision of the evidentiary use . . .will
183. Id. at 571.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id. at 567.

187. Id. at 572-74, 576-77, 587. The court analogized the procedural safeguards which negated the privacy right in Whalen to the procedure involved
in Lora to assure anonymity for students whose records were examined. Id.
at 572-74.
188. See note 150 supra.

189. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 600. Lifschutz can be viewed in a similar
way, as there was no infringement of the constitutionally protected area because there was a waiver of the privilege. For discussion of Lifschutz, see
notes 166-69 and accompanying text supra.
190. See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
191. 429 U.S. at 601.

192. Id.
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provide inadequate protection against unwarranted disclosures is
surely not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire patientidentification program." '98
Addressing the privacy-autonomy interest in making certain
important decisions, the Court rejected the argument that the
person's choice was inhibited since a person could still decide, with
the advice of a physician, that a certain drug was needed. The
Court noted that "the decision to prescribe, or to use, is left entirely
to the physician and the patient." 194
In balancing the privacy right involved against the state's purpose for infringing upon that right, the Whalen Court apparently
was using a reasonableness test. The opinion emphasized the need
for the state to experiment with various methods of halting a growing drug problem. 195 This purpose, combined with the extensive
statutory procedures protecting against disclosure, led the Court to
conclude that the statutory scheme "was a reasonable exercise of
New York's broad police powers." 106
The infringement involved in the psychotherapist-patient context is greater than in Whalen, as the nature of the matter disclosed
is substantially more personal. The United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey recognized this distinction in McKenna v. Fargo.9 7 In McKenna, applicants for jobs as firefighters
were required to submit to a series of psychological tests and evaluations. 9 8 Holding that this was an infringement of a constitutionally
protected area, the McKenna court distinguished Whalen, on the
ground that both "the degree and character of the disclosure [were]
far greater and more intrusive" in McKenna than in Whalen.199,
While the information disclosed in Whalen consisted of only the
patient's identity and his use of a certain drug, the evaluations in
193. Id. at 601-02. The court analogized the possibility of disclosure to
employees of the health department who had access to the files with disclosures
commonly made to doctors, hospital personnel, and insurance companies. Id.
194. Id. at 603.
195. Id. at 598.
196. Id.
197. 451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978), afl'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979).
For further discussion of McKenna, see notes 215-18 and accompanying text
infra.
198. 451 F. Supp. at 1359-63. The tests were administered to determine
whether the applicant could withstand the pressures inherent in firefighting.
Id. at 1357.
199. 1d. at 1380.
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McKenna looked "deeply into an applicant's personality." 200 The
fact that there was no public disclosure of the information was
found to be irrelevant since "the amount of information given to
the Government alone was itself an intrusion ....

201

Although

the court concluded that the tests were constitutional because the
intrusion on the plaintiffs' privacy rights was justified by compelling
state interests, 20 2 it is clear that under the standard applied in McKenna there would be an intrusion upon the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in a child placement case. Indeed, the McKenna court
used the private psychotherapist-patient relationship as a standard
by which to judge the severity of the intrusion upon the applicant.2 0 3
3. Sufficient State Interest to Justify Intrusion
Once it is established that a privacy interest is involved and a
governmental intrusion has occurred, the third question which a
court must address is whether there is a sufficient state interest to
justify the intrusion. 2 4 Generally speaking, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the right of privacy is fundamental, requiring the
application of the compelling state interest test, rather than the
rational relationship test. 205 There is some indication, however,
that in certain instances a lesser state interest may justify intrusion
upon privacy rights. In Whalen, for example, the Court spoke of
the reasonableness of the state's actions as a reason for the lack of
20
an infringement.
In any event, since the state can meet the compelling interest
standard in child custody cases, the problem need not be resolved
here. One would be hard pressed to find a state interest which is
more compelling than the protection of the welfare of children.
Indeed, the parens patriaedoctrine, underlying the state's regulation
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1381.
202. Id. at 1381-82. See notes 204-05 infra.
203. The McKenna court pointed out that the intrusion caused by the
evaluation was in degree and character equal to the situation in which one
engaged a private psychologist. 451 F. Supp. at 1380.
204. See note 150 supra.
205. Id. The Court's clearest articulation of the compelling state interest
requirement has been in the abortion cases. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). See note 155 supra.
206. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 598. For discussion of Whalen, see notes
159-65 & 189-96 and accompanying text supra.
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of various aspects of the child's life, is an articulation of this com20 T
pelling interest.
4. Intrusion Narrowly Circumscribed
As with the question of compelling state interest versus rational
relationship, the permissible extent of the state's infringement upon
the privacy right is unclear. Generally, once a right is determined
to be fundamental, and assuming there is a compelling state interest,
the state's intrusion must be narrowly circumscribed. 20
Although
the "least restrictive alternative" requirement has not been universally applied, under either that analysis or a rational relationship
test, the state may not require the blanket disclosure of a proposed
custodian's psychological records in a custody determination without
some reasonable justification. Given the uncertainty of finding
relevant information, blanket disclosure bears no reasonable relationship to the state's interests. In many, if not most of these cases,
the state's compelling interest may be satisfied by less than full
disclosure. Further, in certain circumstances the state's interest is
greater than in others. Therefore, a state's system of intrusion
209
should be adaptable to different circumstances.
This analysis has been applied to other issues arising in child
custody decisions.210 For example, one area in which there has been
a great deal of conflict between a parent's rights and the court's need
to determine the best interests of the child is in custody cases involving homosexual parents. Traditionally, courts have treated
homosexuality as an absolute bar to custody. 211 A growing number
of jurisdictions, however, require a nexus between a parent's homo212
sexuality and harm to the child.
One of the rationales underlying this nexus requirement has
been the recognition of a constitutional right of privacy. The posi207. See Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of, In, and For Children,
& CONTEMP. PROB. 118 (Summer 1975); Garvey, supra note 1, at 796.
208. See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964). In NAACP, the Court
stated that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Id. at 307.
209. See notes 232-33 and accompanying text infra.
210. For discussion of one of these issues, that of subordinating parents'
right to the best interests of the child, see Comment, supra note 1, at 733-37.
211. See Commonwealth ex rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 171 Pa. Super. Ct.
587, 91 A.2d 379 (1952).
212. See, e.g., Nadler v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 523, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1967); Christian v. Randall, 33 Colo. App. 129, 516 P.2d 132 (1973);
People v. Brown, 49 Mich. App. 358, 212 N.W.2d 55 (1973).
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tion taken by some of the commentators is that a parent's sexual
preference is an interest protected by the right of privacy and the
state's refusal to allow the parent to have custody, if based solely on
such preference, is an infringement of that right. 213 Thus, the state
must have a compelling interest to infringe upon that right. As in
all child placement cases, it is hard to deny that there is such a
compelling state interest. The courts and commentators have gone
on to say, however, that since the constitutional privacy right requires the state to demonstrate a relationship between its interest
and its activity, the state may not make homosexuality a per se
disqualification, but must establish a nexus between homosexuality
214
and harm to the child.
The court in McKenna used a similar analysis once it had determined that there was a constitutional infringement of the privacy
right and that there was a compelling state interest in requiring the
examination and other hiring procedures. 215 The court held that
the procedure was not as narrowly drawn as it should be and, while
holding the scheme constitutional, required additional protections
aimed at limiting access to the records. 21 6 To protect the individual,
the court directed the defendant to promulgate rules and sanctions
which would limit its employees' access to the data to situations in
which there was a "need to know." 217 Further, the court required
the defendant to set a reasonable limit on how long the records
would be retained before destruction.2 18 The court's adoption of
these requirements evidences the same concern as that expressed by
the Supreme Court in Whalen, namely, protection against unwarranted disclosure.
B. A Suggested Analysis

The Lora court proposed a balancing test which was similar to
both the Rule 35 good cause test and the Hickox test. 219 In its
balancing process, the Lora court asked four questions: 1) is identi213. See, e.g., Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers, 25
L. REv. 691 (1976); Lauerman, supra note 3, at 690; Riley, The
Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional
Challenge That Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 799 (1975).
BUFFALO

214. See notes 212 & 13 supra and authorities cited therein.
215. McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. at 1380-81. For further discussion of
McKenna, see notes 197-203 and accompanying text supra.

216.
217.
218.
219.

451 F. Supp. at 1382.
Id.
Id.
See notes 114-17 supra.
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fication of the individuals required for effective use of the data; 2)
is the risk of harm minimized; 3) will the data be supplied only to
qualified persons in strict confidence; and 4) is the information
necessary or merely desirable? 2o In weighing the answers to these
questions, the court held that the interest in compelling disclosure
was the greater. 22' In reaching a decision, the court relied on its
authority to issue a confidentiality order and on the anonymous
222
nature of the information disclosed.
The factors considered in this analysis suggest that an alternate
223
analysis, like the one proposed previously for statutory privileges,
might also be of benefit in the constitutional context. The constitutional nature of the protection, however, would require an even
greater showing of good cause than mere logical relevancy. Indeed,
the constitutional mandate would indicate that the necessity requirement is paramount.
To accomplish the difficult task of specifically delineating what
must be shown to justify intrusion into the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the four-part inquiry used in Lora provides guidelines
that are consistent with the suggested analysis: since the scope of
the disclosure can be limited by using traditional relevancy analysis
and access to the data can be limited to only qualified persons in
strict confidence by the exercise of judicial supervision, harm can
be minimized. Judicial supervision was recognized as a sufficient
protection in Whalen, and the District of Columbia, for example,
has a statute which limits access to court records in child placement
224
determinations.
Determining whether the information is necessary or simply
desirable, however, raises a more difficult question. It is submitted
that the way to address the question is for the court to require a
court-appointed psychiatric evaluation prior to determining access
to past psychotherapy records. 22 5 This procedure would provide a
220. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. at 579. For discussion of Lora, see
notes 179-87 and accompanying text supra.
221. 74 F.R.D. at 583-84.
222. Id. at 582-83.
223. See section IIC supra.

224. See D.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 16-2335 (Supp. 1978).

225. This was the procedure followed by the court in Perry v. Fiumano,
61 A.D.2d 512, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1978).

For discussion of Perry, see notes

107-11 and accompanying text supra. The court stated that it would order
production of the respondent's records only if they were necessary to the
court-appointed psychiatrist in his "complete evaluation of respondent's mental
and emotional condition." 61 A.D.2d at 520, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
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narrowly-circumscribed method for determining necessity and would
have several advantages in protecting against unnecessary disclosure.
Since the referral is not for treatment, but solely for the purpose of the litigation, the parties should be aware of the purpose
for establishing the relationship so they can act accordingly. Indeed, it might be best if persons being evaluated were told that the
psychotherapist's report is not privileged. The second advantage,
which addresses the question posed in Lora of whether the equivalent of the privilege exists, is that the court-appointed psychotherapist may well be able to acquire more relevant information
than is available from either past treating psychotherapists or their
records. And, as Professor Slovenko points out, because of the
nature of psychotherapy, treating psychotherapists often keep no
records. 220 Further, even if they do, a psychotherapist appointed to
explore a specific legal problem may acquire more relevant information than one who has been seeing the party for therapy totally
undirected towards the legal issue.2 27 If the court-appointed psychotherapist wanted to review the privileged records, an inquiry into
their relevance could be made looking to the factors discussed above.
Indeed, this procedure would be a direct showing that the state's
228
method was reasonably related to its interest.
This procedure was followed in In re B. 229 In that case, although it was a court-appointed psychotherapist who instituted the
request to see the records, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found
the intrusion unjustified.2 30 The best alternative available, the
court held, was for the mother to volunteer for a court-appointed
28
examination. '
It must be questioned whether In re B would apply to all situations involving the best interests of the child. As mentioned
226. Slovenko, supra note 98, at 651.
227. Id. at 662.
228. See e.g., Roper v. Roper, 336 So. 2d 654 (Fla. App. 1976); Perry v.
Fiumano, 61 A.D.2d 512, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1978). For discussion of Roper,
see notes 73-78 and accompanying text supra. For discussion of Perry, see
notes 107-I1 & 225 and accompanying text supra.
229. 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978) (opinion of only a minority of the
court). For discussion of B, see notes 170-75 and accompanying text supra.
See also Miller v. Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 741 (M.D.
Pa. 1979). In Miller, a personal injury action, the court discussed In re B,
concluding that the constitutional privilege, even if it exists, is not absolute,
and denied a motion to quash a subpoena for the plaintiff's psychiatric records.
230. 482 Pa. at 484-86, 394 A.2d at 425-26.
231. Id. at 486, 394 A.2d at 426.
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above,23 2 the state's interest in different types of proceedings may
vary. For example, does the fact that B was adjudicated a delinquent affect the state's interest? It could be argued that because
the mother was not a party to the action the court's powers should
be more limited. Such an argument, however, parallels the reasoning of the Florida cases discussed above 233 which made relevancy a
question of who brings the suit - the party seeking disclosure or the
party trying to avoid disclosure.
A more persuasive argument may be that the state's interest in
B was ever greater than in a private custody action since B, adjudicated a delinquent, was a person in whom the state had a special
concern. This would also lead to the conclusion that in dependency
or neglect cases the state's interest also is greater. The allowable
intrusion, therefore, should be greater since a demonstrative problem will have been shown, although with one of the potential
custodians, rather than with the child.
More fruitful than either of these arguments, however, would
be a consistent approach. Since in all instances the question is
what is best for the child, the state's interest remains the same and
the court should rely on an analysis with the varying degrees of
relevancy as the distinguishing factor. If, for example, a nexus can
be established between the parent and his mental fitness to care for
the child, the court-appointed psychotherapist can initiate a request
for the privileged records. The reviewing judge, after a hearing,
23
may then allow a greater intrusion only upon a showing of need.

IV.

4

CONCLUSION

If necessary to a proper placement decision, testimony from a
privately-retained psychotherapist should be considered. In light
of the strong reasons for the existence of the statutory privilege and
the demands of the constitutional right of privacy, however, the
decision to permit such testimony deserves a more logical treatment
than it has heretofore received.
A court should not unquestioningly allow unrestricted access
into the psychotherapist-patient relationship as is often done under
traditional privilege analysis. Less intrusive means of obtaining the
information often exist. In addition, the value of a psychotherapist's
232. See note 209 and accompanying text supra.
233. See notes 73-98 and accompanying text supra.
234. See generally Slovenko, supra note 98, at 659 n.21; Weihofen, supra
note 7, at 80.
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testimony stemming from a relationship not specifically directed to
the question of custody is questionable. These considerations suggest that unrestricted intrusion is not always necessary. An analysis
premised on deductive reasoning as a basis for determining relevancy provides a sound framework for establishing when the
psychotherapist-patient privilege should be breached.
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